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EVIDENCE SEIZED BY FIRE MARSHAL WITHOUT
SEARCH WARRANT HELD INADMISSIBLE
State v. Buxton,
148 N.E.2d 547 (Ind. 1958)
While a deputy state fire marshal, a member of the National
Board of Fire Underwriters and a state police photographer were in-
vestigating a fire which extensively burned the interior of a restaurant
building, they discovered a hole in the floor containing a hot plate, the
cord for the hot plate, a pile of torn newspapers and a gunny sack
soaked in fuel oil. These materials were seized as evidence in an arson
prosecution against Buxton, the restaurant owner. The evidence was
excluded and Buxton acquitted because it had been obtained in violation
of the Indiana constitutional provision against unreasonable search and
seizure,' the investigation having been conducted without a search
warrant.
2
The constitutional protection of person and property from un-
reasonable searches and seizures3 is one of the rights which distinguishes
this country from the police states of the world today. But even this
country has not always had this protection. In England and the Ameri-
can colonies a practice had developed whereby officers of the King might
obtain writs of assistance4 which permitted them to enter any and all
places at will, to search and seize such papers and evidence as they
pleased. Such breaches of privacy were tolerated because of "necessity,"
to enforce the law, but in the monumental English case of Entick v.
Carrington,5 these instruments of outrage were held invalid.
The facts of this case present two distinct problems: (1) Is such a
search as this without a warrant an unreasonable search? (2) If so,
are the material and information thus obtained admissible in evidence in
1IND. CONST. art. 1, § 11, State v. Buxton, 148 N.E.2d 547 (Ind. 1958);
Dalton v. State, 230 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d 509 (1952) ; Dearing v. State, 226 Ind.
273, 79 N.E.2d 535 (1948) ; Batts v. State, 194 Ind. 609, 144 N.E. 23 (1924) ; Flum
v. State, 193 Ind. 585, 141 N.E. 353 (1923) ; Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 91, 138
N.E. 817 (1923).
2 State v. Buxton, supra note 1. See Idol v. State, 233 Ind. 307, 119 N.E.2d
428 (1954).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; IND. CONsT. art. 1, § 11.
4 Authorized by the statute of 12 CHAS. 11 (1672).
5 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765). Here was founded the doctrine, "Every man's
home is his castle." For an excellent discussion of the historical background of this
doctrine, both in England and the United States, see People v. Marxhausen, 204
Mich. 559, 563-66, 171 N.W. 557, 558-59 (1919). Speaking of the rejection of the
writs of assistance in Boston in 1761, John Adams wrote in a letter to William
Tudor, March 29, 1817, which may be found at 10 LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS
244, "then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary
claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born."
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a criminal prosecution? Neither problem admits of ready solution.
The first problem must be approached by attempting to balance the
right of the individual to privacy against the obligation of the govern-
ment to protect its citizens. With respect to the individual, we must con-
sider what right was invaded and to what extent. As to the state,
consideration must be given to the appropriateness of the intervention
and the particular public interest that is being protected.6
The court resolved the balance in favor of Buxton. The state had
relied on the facts that the state fire marshal law,7 although authorizing
and directing that fires be investigated, did not specifically require a
warrant, and that this statute was designed to protect the safety and
well-being of all the persons as guaranteed by the state constitution.'
The court, however, held that although the safety of the people prevails
over private rights, such safety provisions as these may readily be effected
without resort to violation of these rights.9
There was an invasion of Buxton's privacy by an investigation
undertaken without the officers' having acquired a search warrant based
upon a showing of probable cause that there was a violation of law. It
does not seem that the magnitude of this intrusion is analogous to that of
the odious writ of assistance. It is, on the contrary, probable that the
owner of property destioyed by fire would welcome assistance in deter-
mining the cause of destruction. There was little invasion of privacy
inasmuch as the building was not in use because of the fire damage and
Buxton certainly gave no appearance of objection to the investigation.
When the officials arrived at 10:00 a.m., which is not an unreasonable
time, they found the door unlocked. Buxton arrived later, talked with
the investigators without protesting, and then departed. The inference is
that neither the officers nor Buxton felt there was anything unreasonable
about this investigation. It is true that we all have "the right to be let
alone," " but it is only unreasonable searches and seizures which are pro-
hibited.11 These officers were investigating the property with a view
principally toward the prevention of future fires. Buxton's interest in
this is as great as that of the state. A search of this nature can hardly
be called unreasonable to the owner.
The state's position is that prompt and thorough investigation of all
fires is essential for the safety of the people. No doubt, everyone would
6 For development of this approach, see STRONG, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 755-860 (1950).
71IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 20-802 to -820 (1950).
8 IND. CONST. art. 1, § 1, provides, among other things: "[A]Il power is
inherent in the People; and that all free governments are, and of right ought to be,
founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and well-being
." (Italics added.)
9 State v. Buxton, supra note 1.
10 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissent).
11 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947) ; Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145 (1947); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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concede that this is desirable. It was further argued, however, that a
routine investigation must be permitted without a search warrant inas-
much as the cause of fire is initially unknown, rendering it impossible to
fulfill the constitutional requirement of probable cause1" upon which the
warrant may issue. It was clearly the legislative will that all fires be
investigated, even when there is the strongest ground for belief of the
innocence of all parties concerned, for probably the principal reason for
investigation is its aid in prevention of future fire losses. This is not the
sort of cry of "necessity" which led to the abuse of the writs of assist-
ance, but a reasonable regulation, essential for effective protection of the
safety of the people. The right to investigate to determine the cause of
fires does not confer on the officers of the state license to exercise arbi-
trary power to trespass upon any and all places at their whim as did the
infamous general writs. It is true that this statute describes no premises
and names no persons specifically, but the right of investigation is ob-
viously limited both as to time and place; i.e., it must be prompt, and
must be restricted to the immediate premises burned.
The state's police powers permit reasonable regulations notwith-
standing the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable search and
seizure and there are a number of cases where inspection has been per-
mitted without requiring a search warrant.13 The court here distin-
guished these cases by the fact that they exemplify situations where a
civil, rather than a criminal, investigation was permitted. Thus it must
be considered whether an investigation to determine the cause of fire is
a criminal or civil investigation, that is, whether its primary purpose is
to prevent future fires and attendant losses or to apprehend arsonists.
Both purposes are included by the express words of the fire marshal
law. 4 It seems, though, that it would be grossly unfair to property
owners to hold that the principal basis for investigation is to see if crimi-
nal intent can be ascribed when their buildings have burned. The United
States Supreme Court recently held that an Ohio fire marshal's inter-
rogation of witnesses to determine the origin of fire was not a criminal
trial but "a proceeding solely to elicit facts relating to the causes and
circumstances of the fire."' 5 This was true even though, if sufficient
evidence was produced to warrant a charge of arson, the result of the
hearing might be an arrest. The basic aim of both the Ohio and the
Indiana statutes authorizing the investigations seems to be, not the appre-
12 IND. CONsT. art. I, § 11, provides that "[N]o warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause. . . ." See Callender v. State, supra note 1. Cf. Shore v. United
States, 49 F.2d 519, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1931), where the court indicated that ordinarily
proof of probable cause requires a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a cautious man in believing a party is
guilty of an offense charged.
13 See cases listed in State v. Buxton, supra note 1, at 551 n. 5. See also 79
C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 6 (1952) and cases cited.
14 See note 7, supra.
15 1n re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 332 (1957).
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hension of criminals, but "the expeditious and expert ascertainment of
the causes of fire" by the "chief guardian of a community against the
hazards of fire."' 6
Looking to the method, rather than the result, it seems that this
investigation was a perfectly valid civil inspection and the officers were
legally on the premises. Had they discovered the incriminating evidence
while Buxton was with them, having probable cause to believe he had
started the fire, they could have arrested him without a warrant.1 7 Then
it would have been permissible to seize the evidence, for it is acceptable
to search for and seize evidence without a warrant where an arrest is
made and when the premises are under control of the person arrested."8
This is not unreasonable. Seizure should, by analogy, be proper without
an immediate arrest. In the instant case, seizure was merely incidental
to the civil inspection, as, likewise it would be only incidental to an arrest,
in which case it would be proper.
The court, however, decided that the search and seizure was un-
reasonable, raising the second question: whether material and information
so obtained should be admitted into evidence. There is an understandable
difference of opinion on this issue in the federal courts and those of the
several states19 for much may be said in favor of either view. The
problem basically is whether officers of the law should have unlimited
freedom subject only to criminal prosecution or the action of trespass
against them if they violate the constitutional provisions of unreasonable
search and seizure. Or whether, in order to prevent any interference
with such constitutional guarantee, convicting evidence should be rejected
because an officer has blundered."0
A slight majority of the states2' today favor the common-law or
orthodox view that such evidence should be admitted. They feel that a
16 Id. at 336 (concurring opinion).
17 Johns v. State, 235 Ind. 464, 134 N.E.2d 552 (1956); Pearman v. State,
233 Ind. 111, 117 N.E.2d 362 (1954).
18 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) ; Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925) ; Carroll v. United States, supra note 11; Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886) ; Henderson v. State, 235 Ind. 134, 131 N.E.2d 326 (1956).
19The common-law rule admitting such evidence is followed in 26 states.
In two of these, Alabama and Maryland, the exclusionary rule is required by
statute for certain circumstances, but the common-law rule is followed for all
other situations not covered by the statutes. Such evidence is excluded in the
federal courts and 22 states. In three of these states the rule is required bbr
statute. The exclusionary rule also prevails in the District of Columbia, Alaska,
and Hawaii. For a comprehensive coverage of this problem, a state-by-state
analysis, and citations of cases, see Annot. 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956). The only
change since this annotation is that in Rhode Island a statute was enacted in 1955,
providing that evidence obtained by illegal search shall be inadmissible, reversing
State v. Olynik, 83 R.I. 31, 113 A.2d 123 (1935). R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. tit. 9, c. 19
§ 25 (1956), State v. Hillman, 125 A.2d 94 (R.I. 1956). See also Note, 31 NoTRE
DAME LAw. 85 (1955).
20 Note, 3 Oao ST. L.J. 73, 77 (1936).
21 See note 19, supra.
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guilty criminal should not be released because of the arresting officer's
blunder. It is contended that the constitutional provision can be ade-
quately enforced by criminal prosecution against violators or by civil
action against the trespassing officers.22
The proponents of the federal or exclusionary rule23 contend that
"the most effective way to protect the guarantees against unreasonable
search and seizure and compelling self-incrimination is to exclude from
evidence any matter obtained by a violation of them."124 It is argued that
any other sanctions against arbitrary searches and seizures are wholly in-
effective and present no deterrent to overzealous law enforcement
officers.25 Recently the trend has been slowly towards the rule excluding
such evidence,2 6 as indicated by the fact that at least the last three states
to change their position on this issue have adopted this view. 27
In states which follow the exclusion rule, it is especially imperative
that the court make a careful analysis of the facts and circumstances of
each case to be certain that the search and seizure is unreasonable before
rejecting the evidence and setting free a man known to be guilty.
Robert E. Leuns
22 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
23 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914).
24 Rickards v. State, 45 Del. 573, 585, 77 A.2d 199, 205 (1950).
25For a strong statement of this position see the dissent of Mr. justice
Murphy in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 4147 (1949).
26 Note, 31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 85 (1955).
27 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955); Rickards v. State,
supra note 24; State v. Hillman, supra note 19, required exclusion because a new
statute was enacted immediately after the court of Rhode Island, in first stating
its position, had adopted the common-law rule of admissibility.
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